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Abstract: 
 The role of governmental risk aversion in the decision to privatize the production of goods and services has not 
been examined closely. Using a model of a risk-averse, single-service Niskanen bureaucrat, we determine the 
conditions under which a bureaucrat will prefer to privatize rather than produce in-house. If the private-sector 
firm is risk neutral, the result will be a fixed-fee contract with complete insurance. If the private-sector firm is 
risk averse, the result will be a cost-plus contract with the degree of cost sharing determined by the bureaucrat's 
share of total risk aversion. In both cases, the bureaucrat's sponsor may affect the likelihood of privatization by 
manipulating the rewards and penalties imposed on the bureaucrat. 
 
Article: 
1. Introduction 
Studies of the privatization of the production of goods or services by government have typically centered on 
descriptions of existing practices (Savas, 1987). Such contracts are commonly believed to exploit private-sector 
economies of scale or other production efficiencies while not diminishing the quality of the good or service. The 
role of risk in these contracts, however, has received little attention (Hirshleifer and Shapiro, 1983). Sappington 
and Stiglitz (1987) provide one of the few examples of a discussion of this issue. Their focus, however, is 
normative and primarily concerned with the effect of private-sector risk aversion. Little attention has been 
focused on the implications of risk aversion on the part of government.
1 
 
This paper provides a positive analysis of the behavior of a risk-averse, budget-maximizing bureaucrat charged 
with producing a single service for some sponsor, such as a legislature. Two difficulties arise in fulfilling this 
obligation. First, the sponsor is unable to monitor the bureaucrat closely and must therefore rely on an indirect 
measure of performance. Second, the bureaucrat is exposed to uncertain political and production risks which 
reduce the bureaucrat's ability to produce the service. Hence, the bureaucrat must choose a specific level of 
effort given indirect monitoring by its sponsor and uncertainty of outcome. 
 
If privatization contracts are not an option, the bureaucrat, of course, must bear all risks. However, if such 
contracts are allowed, the bureaucrat may prefer to privatize the production process rather than produce the 
good in-house. The form of privatization contract will depend on whether the private-sector firm is risk neutral 
or risk averse. If the firm is risk neutral, the contract will be a fixed-fee contract with guaranteed output. If the 
firm is risk averse, the contract will be of the cost-plus variety with specific terms dependent on the relative 
degree of risk aversion attributable to the bureaucrat. 
 
The results presented here are important for at least two reasons. First, they suggest that an increased threat 
from a bureau's sponsor (such as a legislative committee or group of local voters) will affect the production 
decisions of the bureaucrat. The ability of a sponsor to threaten its bureaucracy has long been noted. Niskanen 
(1971: 42), for example, argues that a "bureau that consistently promises more than it can deliver will be 
penalized by the discounting of future promises and lower budgets" whereas "a bureau that consistently 
performs better than expected is likely to be rewarded by higher future budgets." Likewise, Weingast (1984) 
describes various indirect monitoring mechanisms by which a supervising legislature can direct rewards and 
punishments at bureaucracies, and Joskow (1974) argues that public-utility regulatory agencies modify their 
policies in order to minimize conflict and criticism. To the extent that threats from sponsors are credible, 
bureaucrats will be more cognizant of political and production risks and will be more likely to have production 
performed by the private sector.
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Second, our analysis sheds light on the determinants of fixed-fee versus cost-plus contracting. Sappington and 
Stiglitz (1987) argue that if the private sector is relatively more risk averse, rents can be captured by the 
government to the extent that it bears the risks of production. Similarly, Stiglitz (1988) argues that government's 
superior ability to spread risk provides a rationale for the cost-plus contracts so common in defense 
procurements. We find that cost-plus contracts will be preferred over fixed-fee contracts whenever any degree 
of private-sector risk aversion is present, though the relative degree of risk aversion between the bureaucrat and 
the private-sector firm will affect the degree to which the bureaucrat shares in any added costs of production. 
 
This paper is outlined as follows. Section 2 provides an initial examination of the bureaucrat's problem in the 
absence of privatization contracts. Sections 2 and 4 then re-examine that problem assuming that privatization 
contracts are possible under the alternative assumptions of a risk-neutral and a risk-averse private-sector firm. 
Section 5 contains a brief summary and offers some concluding comments. 
 
2. Production in the absence of privatization 
Following Niskanen (1971), consider a budget-maximizing bureaucrat that has received a budget B from a 
legislature in return for providing a single service. See Figure 1 for a decision time line of this process. Assume, 
moreover, that the legislature cannot observe the effort of the bureaucrat directly and so must, instead, rely on 
the observation of the bureaucrat's output γ.
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 As a result, the legislature makes the budget size a function of γ: 
 
B = B(γ). (1) 
 
In determining the structure of the budget function B(γ),
4
 we assume that the legislature has a preference for a 
particular quantity of output and is willing to reward further bureaucratic efforts somewhat. However, it also 
wishes to send strong signals that decreased bureaucrat effort will not be rewarded. Given the inability to view 
effort directly, then, the legislature structures the budget function such that:
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dB/dγ > 0 (2) 
d
2
B/dγ
2
 < 0. (3) 
 
Finally, assume that the legislature requires the bureaucrat to balance its budget, that is, total costs C must be 
equal to the allocated budget: 
 
C = B(γ). (4) 
 
Given the budget, the bureaucrat begins the production process. Bureaucracies are generally exposed to both 
production and political risks in producing a service. Production risks have their origins in the physical 
production process itself and are not directly connected to political forces. Their effect is to reduce the 
productivity of the bureaucrat and therefore raise the costs of production. Gomez-Ibanez, Meyer, and Luberoff 
(1990), for example, argue that many communities prefer to have private firms handle solid-waste disposal in 
order to avoid the risks associated with the use of modern, technologically sophisticated disposal technologies. 
Political risks, on the other hand, while also reducing the productivity of the bureaucrat find their origins in the 
political arena. Thus, for example, Joskow (1974) in his examination of public-utility regulatory agencies, 
describes the early 1970s as a time characterized by an unanticipated slowdown in the regulation process due to 
inflation and to the rise of politically active environmentalists.
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We assume that the bureaucrat sets in motion the production process by committing to a particular level of 
effort and that only after that commitment is made will the production or political risks manifest themselves in a 
particular realization. Thus: 
 
γ = γ(E,  )  (5) 
 
where E represents the level of bureaucratic effort and   represents the presence of production or political risk. 
An index variable,   is assumed to be a random draw from a set of possible states-of-nature Ө and has the 
known distribution function f( ). Let   take on non-negative values with greater values of   implying 
increasingly lower values of γ: 
 
  /   < 0 (6) 
 2γ/  2 ≤ 0.  (7) 
 
For a given level of effort, define the maximum output level to be that level associated with   equal to zero. 
Hence,   > 0 defines a loss L of output: 
 
L = L( ;E) = γ(E, 0) — γ(E,  ). (8) 
 
Finally, assume that γ is a positive, strictly concave function of E and that increases in   reduce the marginal 
productivity of E: 
 
 2γ/   E < 0. (9) 
 
The cost of producing γ is assumed to increase at an increasing rate with the total level of effort expended, that 
is: 
 
C = C(E) (10) 
 
such that: 
 
dC/dE > 0 (11) 
d
2
C/dE
2
 > 0. (12) 
 
Hence, the bureaucrat's problem is to maximize the expected (e) budget: 
 
subject to the constraint that the budget balances in expectation: 
 
Given the assumptions on the production function for γ and the preferences of the legislature as embodied in the 
budget function B, this problem has an unique solution characterized by the first-order condition: 
 
Equation (15) implicitly defines the optimal level of effort E* and thus the optimal expected budget B*. 
However, while the budget balances in anticipation, it may not balance after any given realization of  . We 
assume that there is sufficient "slack" in the bureau's operations to accommodate last-minute, unanticipated 
budgetary deficits or surpluses. Anecdotal evidence in the form of end-of-the-fiscal-year buying sprees and belt-
tightening measures suggests bureaucrats are quite skilled at such last minute adjustments. 
 
Note, finally, that although the bureaucrat's preferences are linear in the size of the budget and thus ostensibly 
risk neutral, the concavity of the budget function offered by the sponsor makes the preferences of the bureaucrat 
risk averse. There are, of course, other reasons why bureaucrats might be risk averse. Wilson (1989), for 
example, suggests that the nature of private versus public enterprises might lead to self-selection among 
individuals such that the more-risk-averse take jobs in government. Interestingly, while many base their analysis 
on an assumption of bureaucratic risk aversion (Mueller, 1989), there is little empirical evidence to either 
support or refute the assumption (Wilson, 1989).
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3. Privatization with a risk-neutral firm 
Because it is risk averse, the bureaucrat has an interest in mitigating the effects of risk through privatization. 
Define a privatization contract as a promise by the private-sector firm to deliver to the bureaucrat a specified 
quantity γc of the desired good and an insurance payment I (conditional on the loss L associated with the 
production of γc) in return for a payment of G dollars. Assume that the insurance payment I is denominated in 
units of γ and equal to some quantity no greater than L: 
 
0 ≤ I(L) ≤ L. (16) 
 
Thus, the contract is composed of a production clause which defines γc and an insurance clause which defines I. 
Let Fc be that portion of G which goes for the purchase of γc, let P be that portion of G which goes for the 
purchase of insurance, and note that: 
 
G = Fc + P. (17) 
 
Assume that the firm has the same production technology as the bureaucrat. Assume further that the firm is 
affected in the same way by production risks but to a lesser degree by political risks. Thus, we can define the 
firm's production function  (E,  ) and note in general that: 
 
 (E,  ) ≥ γ(E,  ). (18) 
 
The level of effort put forth by the firm is a function of the funds devoted to the production process. In order for 
the effect of differing input costs not to cloud the analysis, we assume that the firm and the bureaucrat have the 
same cost equation (equation (10)). Hence, the firm's effort will be a positive, concave function of the funds F 
devoted to the production process: 
 
E = C
-1
(F). (19) 
 
The contracted level of output γc is defined as the level of output generated by an input of Fc funds under the 
assumption of no risk, that is,   = 0: 
 
γc =  (C
-1
(Fc), 0). (20) 
 
Assume that the cost to the firm of administering the insurance portion of the contract is fixed and, for 
expositional convenience, let it equal zero. Assume also that there is a sufficient degree of competition in the 
private sector so that the profits from the privatization contract are bid to zero. The premium for the insurance 
portion of the contract will then be actuarially fair and equal to the expected cost of the insurance payment I. 
The expected cost to the firm of providing the insurance will depend upon how well the firm meets its 
contractual obligations despite the loss L. In reality, a firm would fulfill a contract by making adjustments 
throughout the production process. Should it become clear that the contracted quantity γc will not be produced 
under current circumstances, the firm, in an iterative manner, would modify its production process. 
 
To incorporate this dynamic adjustment process into our static model, suppose that the contract allows for the 
production of γc to take place in two steps (see Figure 2). The first step has already been described: decisions 
are made before   is known, some quantity γo is produced, and a loss L equal to (γc — γ0) ≥ 0 is realized. If and 
only if this loss is positive will the second step take place. Knowing the value of   from the first step (say  0), 
assume the firm must re-perform the production of γ augmenting the process with additional private funds, FI so 
as to produce an additional quantity I. Because   in this second step is known, the production process is now 
deterministic. Hence, FI is implicitly defined by the equation: 
 
γc — L + I =  (C
-1
(Fc + FI),  0).     (21) 
 
Thus, given a particular insurance function I, FI can be written in general notation as: 
 
FI = FI(Fc,  ). (22) 
 
Note that FI is a positive function of Fc. 
 
This process is illustrated in Figure 3. Let the bureaucrat contribute Fc dollars in exchange for the contracted 
quantity γc. In the first stage of production, the firm realizes a loss L = γc – γ1 as a result of drawing a   equal to 
 1. Actual total output from stage one is γ1 which, as drawn, is less than the contracted quantity γc. A second 
stage of production is therefore required. Given that the firm now knows   =  1 the firm determines that F1 
dollars are required to increase the total output by I, the contracted insurance payment. 
 
F1 is, of course, the actual cost to the firm of providing the insurance payment, I, to the bureaucrat. The 
actuarially fair premium, P, is therefore the expected value of FI: 
P = FI
e
 = ∫ FI(Fc,  ) f( ) d . (23) 
Thus, the premium will be a positive function of the bureaucracy's production costs Fc: 
 
P = P(Fc). (24) 
 
Finally, note that the expected profits for the firm will be: 
 
which by equations (17) and (23) equals zero. By construction, the firm is risk neutra1.
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Given equations (17) and (24), the choice of G uniquely determines the contracted quantity γc. Thus, we can 
rewrite γc (equation (20)) as: 
 
Note that γc is a positive, strictly concave function of G with G the bureaucrat's only decision variable. 
 
The bureaucrat's problem assuming it privatizes the production of γ is to maximize the expected size of its 
budget through the appropriate specification of the insurance function I(L) and the appropriate choice of G. 
Given the assumption of a risk-neutral firm and a fixed cost of administering the insurance portion of the 
contract, the bureaucrat will choose an insurance contract with no deductible and no coinsurance (Raviv, 1979), 
that is:
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Thus, the optimal privatization contract will be a fixed-fee contract with the firm guaranteeing delivery of the 
quantity γc. The bureaucrat's problem therefore becomes the deterministic problem: 
 
subject to the constraint that the budget balances: 
 
The solution to this problem is unique and characterized by the first-order condition: 
 
which implicitly defines the optimal level of government spending,   , and thus the optimal budget   . 
 
Whether, in fact, the bureaucrat prefers to privatize rather than produce the good in-house will depend on the 
effect of privatization on budget size. If privatization increases the budget size, that is, if    > B*, then the 
bureaucrat will choose to privatize. 
 
To determine whether    is greater than B*, note first that there is an output level γCE which is lower than γ* (the 
expected output if the service is produced in-house) and which if produced with certainty would generate a 
budget equal in size to B*. The budget which will obtain under a privatization contract,   , will be greater than 
the expected in-house production budget, B*, if a privatization contract with the level of output set equal to γCE 
results in a budgetary surplus, that is, if: 
 
where GCE is the cost to the bureaucrat of a privatization contract for an output of γCE. 
 
Figure 4 provides an illustration under the assumptions that   represents production risks, that   can take only a 
value of 0 or some  1 > 0, and that the probability of   = 0 and   =  1 are both 1/2. If the bureaucrat produces 
the service in-house, the solution to the bureaucrat's problem is to expend an effort which generates costs of F*. 
At F*, there is a 50% chance that output will be γH and a 50°7o chance that output will be γL. Hence, the 
expected budget will be B*. At B* the balanced budget requirement is met (B* equals F*) and the expected 
level of output is γ*. Note finally, that γCE is the level of output which, if produced with certainty, would also 
generate a budget of B*. 
 
If the bureaucrat contracts with a private firm to produce γCE with full insurance, the firm's costs will be Fc with 
probability 1/2 and F1 with probability 1/2. (For the moment, ignore the curve labeled γ(C
-1
(F),  2).) Hence, the 
expected cost to the firm of producing γCE will be (Fc + F1)/2 which is smaller than B*.
10
 Hence there is a 
budgetary surplus, and it pays to privatize. With the optimal privatization contract, output will be somewhat 
larger than γCE and therefore    will be larger than B*. In general, the contracted quantity γc may be larger or 
smaller than the expected in-house quantity γ*. However, if the private firm can produce the quantity γ* at a 
cost less than F*, the level of γc will also be greater than γ*. 
 
It is possible, however, that the bureaucrat will prefer the riskier option of in-house production. Burness, 
Montgomery, and Quirk (1980), for example, examine the decision making of a regulated firm in a Joskow-type 
model of regulation and note that under rather general circumstances the firm will actually prefer a risky option 
over a risk-free alternative. Figure 4 illustrates these circumstances within the context of our model. If    equals 
0 with probability 1/2 and some  2 with probability 1/2, and if  2 is sufficiently greater than  1, we find that 
while the solution to the bureaucrat's in-house production problem is the same, the expected cost to the firm of 
producing γCE will be (Fc + F2)/2 which is larger than B*. Hence a privatization contract for γCE would result in 
a budgetary deficit, and only a contract for a lower level of output would balance the budget. However, this 
would reduce the budget size below what the bureaucrat expects to get through in-house production and will 
therefore not be preferred. The choice of a riskier alternative, therefore, does not imply a preference for risk per 
se. Rather, it indicates that the cost of insuring the risk exceeds the willingness to pay for it. 
 
This analysis applies all the more if   represents political risks. Recall that if the risk is political in nature, the 
private firm will be affected less by any realization of   than the bureaucracy would, that is,   > γ. Hence, the 
likelihood of privatization will be greater because the firm provides an absolute cost advantage in addition to its 
role as insurer. 
 
Note, finally, that the likelihood of privatization is directly connected to the budget function provided by the 
sponsor and is therefore subject to manipulation. Changes in the political climate, for example, which lead to a 
more con-cave budget function B(γ) (such as might occur if greater penalties are assessed for production below 
a target level) will tend to reduce the certainty equivalent budget γCE and thereby make it more likely that 
privatization will be chosen. 
 
4. Privatization with a risk-averse firm 
The analysis so far has assumed that the private-sector firm is risk neutral. However, as Carlson (1991) reveals, 
risk aversion is a possibility for many firms, particularly those that are small or for which governmental 
contracts make up a substantial portion of their business. Following Raviv (1979), we note that if the private-
sector firm is risk averse, the optimal insurance contract will now include a coinsurance clause, that is: 
 
I = α L (32) 
where α represents the degree to which the bureaucrat will share the production risks with the private firm and 
is determined by the relative degree of bureaucratic risk aversion: 
 
 
 
subject to the constraint that the budget balance in expectation: 
 
The solution to this problem is again unique and characterized by the first-order condition: 
 
The effect of this will depend on the value of α. For values of a close to one, that is, if the firm has relatively 
little risk aversion, the outcome will be very similar to that described for the case of a risk-neutral-firm. 
However, as the firm's degree of risk aversion rises, α will fall. Hence, the likelihood that the bureaucrat will 
find a privatization contract which outperforms what can be achieved by in-house production will fall. 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
This paper examined the effect of bureaucratic risk aversion on the decision to privatize production. If the 
private-sector firm is risk neutral, the bureaucrat will prefer to privatize if it can find a firm willing to produce a 
quantity of out-put which generates the same budget as the bureaucrat expects to get through in-house 
production and do so at lower cost. The contract itself will be a fixed-fee contract with full insurance. If the firm 
is risk averse, the ideal contract will have only partial insurance with the decision to privatize hinging on 
whether the expected budget is greater under privatization or in-house production. Essentially, this results in a 
cost-plus type contract for bureaucracies interested in a particular level of output. Because the form of the 
budget function affects the likelihood of a bureaucracy preferring a privatization contract, sponsors through 
appropriate manipulation of the reward and penalty structure may be able to induce bureaucracies to privatize 
more. 
 
Why is privatization a potentially beneficial alternative for the bureaucrat? Clearly, risk aversion on the part of 
the bureaucrat plays a part, for without it the bureaucrat would have no incentive to seek insurance. However, 
beyond the preferences of the bureaucrat, it is also necessary that the private firm have some form of superior 
technology. We do not mean by this that the firm can simply produce the good cheaper using fewer inputs, 
though that may be the case. What we have in mind is a more subtle superiority connected to the ability to 
revise decisions in the light of new information. As Gomez-Ibanez, Meyer, and Luberoff (1990) note, the public 
sector is often less flexible than its private sector counterpart because of cumbersome work rules and a tendency 
to engage in a slow production process that requires one stage to be completed before moving on to the next. 
This is the essence of our model of bureaucratic versus private-sector production processes. For the bureaucrat, 
the production process is essentially static with input levels chosen before the effects of risk are realized. For 
the firm, however, the process is dynamic. While the firm also targets a level of output and commits to a level 
of inputs, it modifies its decisions as the production process progresses. As a result, while the bureaucrat only 
comes to know the effects of risk ex post, the firm through an iterative process comes to know the effects of risk 
ex ante.
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It needs to be emphasized, however, that the opportunity to privatize does not necessarily mean that it is 
desirable. Beyond the factors discussed in this paper, there may be other risks such as those associated with 
public employment considerations which arise only if the bureaucrat chooses to privatize. To the extent such 
risks exist, they will act as a counterbalance to the forces which induce the bureaucrat to privatize. 
 
Finally, our analysis suggests that popular perceptions of bloated and padded governmental contracts may in 
fact have some validity. A contract involving a risky production process will contain a risk premium paid by the 
government to the private-sector firm in compensation for accepting the burden of those risks. These added 
costs are, however, unavoidable unless the bureaucrat can be persuaded to bear more risk. The greater the risk, 
the greater premium, and therefore the greater the perceived contract padding. While it is not clear how much 
the popular perception of padded governmental contracts are due to the necessity of paying an insurance 
premium, there are examples of fixed-fee contracts with complete insurance. Perhaps the clearest examples are 
con-tracts which require performance bonds. Performance bonds are devices used to ensure that a production 
contract is enforced. If the firm reneges on its contract, the government receives a compensating payment. 
While the amount of the bond is open to negotiation, Savas (1987) argues that such bonds should be set at a 
level just sufficient to compensate the bureau for having to make alternative arrangements. To not do so, he 
argues, would only hurt the government because the cost to the firm of the bond is built into the contract price. 
In essence, then, our analysis suggests that such contracts result in the firm guaranteeing the originally 
contracted output. 
 
Notes 
1. For a critical evaluation of the standard economies-of-scale argument, see Gomez-lbanez, Meyer, and 
Luberoff (1990). Though not directly concerned with the effect of risk aversion, their two case studies 
emphasize the importance of risk in governmental decision making. 
2. This argument is also consistent with Sava's (1987: 256) view that before privatization can occur there must 
be "some precipitating event [which] makes it impossible to continue with the status quo." Among the events he 
considers to be precipitating are pressure from courts, pressure from higher levels of government, or other 
events that arouse public indignation. 
3. Lindsay (1976) argues that a legislature typically monitors a subset of all attributes of the man-dated 
service. As a result, the bureaucrat only focuses its attention on the monitored subset of attributes. The reader 
may therefore prefer to think of γ as a vector of monitored attributes. 
4. The specific form of the budget function B(γ) is determined through a complex principal-agent problem 
beyond the scope of this paper. For insight, see McCubbins and Page (1987), Sapping-ton (1991), and Weingast 
(1984). In part, the difficulty with analyzing this problem is tied to the mathematical problem of using optimal 
control theory with constraints which are typically nonconvex. See Rasmussen (1989). 
5. An alternative specification would be to assume that dB/dγ is some positive constant for out-put less than 
the desired quantity and zero thereafter. For still another concave budget function based on a more explicit 
treatment of penalties for unacceptable bureaucratic behavior see Bendor, Taylor, and Van Gaalen (1985). 
6. The resulting change in regulatory policies suggests rent avoidance behavior. See Tullock (1980). 
7. Informal evidence abounds. Donahue (1989) discusses a Touche Ross survey of local public managers in 
which cutting risk was the second most cited reason for privatizing physical facilities. See also Carlson's (1991) 
description of the U.S. Information Agency's recent experience in producing TV Marti for broadcast to Cuba. 
8. We have ignored possible additional motivations for the private-sector firm's involvement. It is possible that 
such contracts provide additional benefits to the firm by creating economies of scale or scope which result in 
additional profits in the private sector. Link, Bozeman, and Leyden (1990), for example, examine the role 
governmental R&D contracts play in expanding the knowledge base of a firm thus creating a basis for expanded 
profit opportunities in the private sector. 
9. Varian (1984) provides a straightforward specification of the demand for insurance for the case of a loss 
with a fixed probability. 
10. The insurance premium P1 will equal (F1 — Fc)/2. Thus, the expected cost to the firm can also be expressed 
as Fc + P1. 
11. The index of absolute risk aversion is defined to be — U"/U' where U is the objective function of the agent 
in question. It is sometimes known as the Arrow-Pratt measure of risk aversion (Varian, 1984). 
12. The privatization of bureaucratic activities is part of a more general issue concerning the appropriate scope 
of organizations. For an insightful discussion of this more general issue, see Simon (1991) and Stiglitz (1991). 
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